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Fusion would deliver a new source of energy from 
the mid of this century. But the fusion research has now to 
make an important step forward by switching from pure 
plasma physics, based on Hydrogen and Deuterium 
plasma, to burning plasmas, implying the use of 
radioactive fuel (the Tritium) and the production of 
intense neutron flux. These aspects bring with them the 
change of fusion devices from laboratory (or industrial) 
facilities to nuclear facilities, with all the necessary 
precautions which are involved. The nuclear aspects of 
fusion reactors and power plants have an impact on 
various domains of the facilities: the approach of safety, 
security and radioprotection, the resistance of materials 
to neutron bombardments, the activation of material and 
the needs of remote handling, the effects of radiations on 
instruments and functional components, and last but not 
least the impact on radioactive waste production and 
recycling. All these aspects will be handled shortly in this 
first approach of the “nuclearization” of fusion reactors 
and facilities..  
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Fusion has been developed since several years in 
various countries in the world to be able to propose a new 
source of energy for mankind. Fusion being the process 
driving the sun and stars has demonstrated to be able to be 
a very important source of energy. But its control and 
confinement on Earth proved to be much more difficult 
than foreseen. The very high temperature or very high 
densities to be reached drove the focus of the research up 
to now on these aspects of high temperatures (for the 
magnetic confinement facilities: tokamaks and 
stellarators) or high densities (like in the inertial 
confinement fusion)
1
 , and not on the nuclear aspects of 
the machines. Nevertheless, now that we are approaching 
the construction of reactors allowing “burning plasma”, 
i.e. facilities which will produce large amount of fusion 
power, the nuclear aspects of the installations are 
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 We will mostly base our analysis on magnetic 
confinement fusion, as this one is probably more 
advanced and closer to the production of energy, but the 
main data and information are valid also for inertial 
confinement, once D-T  mixture will be used. 
becoming more and more important and have to be taken 
into account in the design and operation of such facilities. 
This lecture will focus mostly on the impacts of the 
nuclear character of the future machines and will thus 
consider that the reader has already a sufficient 
knowledge of fusion facilities, and in particular of 
tokamak type installations. One considers also that a 
sufficient basic knowledge of nuclear physics is present, 
although some of the main phenomena will be reminded 
or shortly introduced.  
Finally, this lecture is only an introduction to a very 
broad domain, which is currently studied and developed 
by a lot of scientists among the World. For further 
information or deeper analysis of the different areas 
which will be only superficially approached, the reader is 
sent to the literature on the different areas. The nuclear 
aspects of a fusion power plant are surely important 
features which need to be taken into account when one 
intends to design and build such a future source of energy. 
 
 
II. THE REASONS OF THE NUCLEAR APPROACH 
 
Fusion reaction is a nuclear process, involving the 
nucleus of the atoms; this is already a first reason to 
consider fusion as a nuclear process (the actual name of 
fusion being in fact “thermonuclear fusion”). 
Nevertheless, if the process did not involve radioactive 
materials, several aspects of the nuclearization would 
have been strongly simplified. Unfortunately, as in most 
nuclear processes and reactions, the fusion reaction 
implies the presence of radioactive isotopes and materials. 
In fusion reactors, the presence of radioactive 
materials can be seen as having three main origins: 
- the use of tritium as fuel, tritium being a 
radioactive species, with a rather short half-life; 
- the activation of the materials facing the plasma or 
being exposed to neutrons coming from the plasma 
and the fusion reactions; 
- the transport of radioactive contamination through 
the cooling fluids and in the air of the auxiliary 
buildings and areas. 
The third origin is in fact more a consequence of the 
two other ones, but it brings the needs of precaution 
sometimes far away from the source of the activity. 
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Let us try to have some facts and figures about the 
different nuclear aspects mentioned above and let us start 
with the tritium. 
Tritium is an isotope of Hydrogen; but unlike the 
Deuterium (one proton, on neutron) which is a stable 
species to be found in seawater, tritium (1 proton, 2 
neutrons) is radioactive, i.e. it disintegrates naturally by 
emitting a beta radiation (an electron) having a rather low 
energy (5.7 keV), to become an 
3
He nucleus (2 protons 
and 1 neutron).  The half-life of tritium (i.e. the time after 
which half of the original atoms have disintegrated) is 
about 12.32 years.  
It is good to remember that after 5 half-lives the 
activity has decreased by a factor 32 (2
5
), while after 10 
half-lives the activity has decreased by a factor close to 
one thousand (2
10
), and 20 half-lives divides the activity 
by a factor close to one million (2
20
). 
The mass of tritium is about three times the one of 
Hydrogen and 1.5 the one of Deuterium. This can play a 
certain role in the particles kinetics within the plasma. 
Finally the fact that tritium decays in Helium has also two 
important impacts: it creates He in the material in which it 
can diffuses, and it creates another source of He within 
the plasma, after the one of the fusion reaction itself: 
D + T  4He + 1n0    (1) 
Another important aspect is the high diffusivity of 
tritium, which follows here the properties of its main 
element, hydrogen. Thus such an isotope can diffuse 
through solid materials (like steel or other metals) easily if 
the temperature is high. 
Finally, for the aspect of safety and health effects, it 
is important to know the ratio between the tritium activity 
and the induced dose in the human body. This figure is 
very small and in the order
2
 of 10
-11
 Bq/Sv:  
  
Dose factor (radiotoxicity) of [1]:  
 
Tritium (gaseous)  = 1,8.10
-15
 Sv/Bq 
Tritiated water (aqueous) = 1,8.10
-11
 Sv/Bq  
Organically bound Tritium (OBT)  = 4,1.10
-11 
Sv/Bq  
 
This very small figure shows the low health impact 
of tritium on the body. Nevertheless, as for any other 
radioactive isotope, the ALARA principle must apply and 
the irradiation (mostly internal irradiation, by inhalation 
or ingestion) should be kept as small as reasonably 
possible. To have an idea of the activity content of tritium 
mass, one can also remember that 1g of T2 gas represents 
about 10 000 Ci or 3.7 10
14
 Bq 
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 For those not very familiar with the Sievert, let us 
remind that the natural background of radiation fluctuates 
between 0.5 and tens mSv per year (thus around  1 µSv/h) 
and the max. occupational planned dose for a nuclear 
worker is set at 20 mSv/y [2]. 
The table 1 below gives a summary of the principal 
properties of tritium. 
 
Property Value Unit 
Half – life 12.32 year 
Beta energy 5.7 keV 
Atomic mass 3,0160492 a.m.u. 
Tritiated water dose factor 1,8.10
-11
 Sv/Bq  
 
Table 1: main properties of Tritium 
 
Let us now look at the activation aspect of materials 
facing the plasma or able to get some neutrons coming 
from the reaction. An important aspect is the neutron 
energy and the neutron flux (or better the so-called 
fluence, i.e. the integrated neutron flux over the time the 
material is exposed to the neutrons) which hits the various 
components of a fusion reactor. The most exposed 
components are indeed the plasma facing components or 
PFC. But as one can see on fig.1 (giving a developed view 
of the facing components of the research tokamak JET), 
the PFC can be very diverse, and one should not only 
focus on the blanket and first wall; heating antenna 
shields and limiters (if any), diagnostic windows or first 
mirrors, viewing systems, etc. are all facing the plasma, in 
a neutronic sense. If for plasma physics, a small 
geometrical recede changes strongly the plasma wall 
interaction, for neutrons, not influenced by the magnetic 
fields, this does not play any role. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Outer wall of JET (developped) 
 
The neutrons have several types of interactions with 
matter, which gives different macroscopic effects on 
components and systems. Neutrons can have elastic and 
inelastic interactions, knocking atoms from their original 
positions (often one single neutron induces a cluster of 
knocked atoms, and loses his energy by several elastic or 
inelastic interactions). Neutrons can also be absorbed by 
some atoms inducing transmutations of the original 
atoms. When the neutron is absorbed, it normally 
disappears, or can lead to an instable atom re-emitting one 
or several other neutrons. The transmuted nuclei are often 
radio-active, and their radioactivity can lead to the 
emission of a proton (leading to Hydrogen formation in 
the material) or to the emission of an alpha particle, 
leading to the creation of Helium inside the material. 
Finally the created radioactive species are often emitting 
gamma (or beta) rays leading to ionization and thus 
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important influence on chemical bounds. The neutrons, by 
knocking atoms, by absorption or by the induced 
radioactivity are also producing heat in the material, 
(called “nuclear heating”) which could be very significant 
for materials directly exposed to the neutron source. This 
is also the main route of transporting the created energy to 
the cooling fluid and subsequently to the turbine. Further 
analysis on this aspect will be done in the chapter IV. 
 
Let us just still make a short comparison with fission 
neutrons, for having some ideas of the orders of 
magnitude and to feel a bit the importance of this aspect. 
In fission, each reaction creates about 200 MeV of energy, 
from which 2.5 neutrons are created in average, taking 
with them energy of around 2 MeV. This means that the 
neutrons take away about 2% of the total energy created, 
the remaining 98% being left in the fuel material by the 
recoils of the fissioned atoms. In fusion the situation is 
rather different! Each reactions produces around 17 MeV, 
from which the created neutron takes away around 14 
MeV, or 82% of the total energy (the remaining 18% 
being transported by the alpha particle which stays in and 
gives its energy to the plasma). Comparing both 
situations, for the same overall energy production of the 
plant, the energy deposited by the neutrons is 33 times 
higher in fusion! The energy per neutron being about 7 
times higher for fusion neutrons, the total number of 
neutrons for the same power is thus almost 5 times larger 
than in fission… Thus the total surface of the first wall of 
a fusion reactor gets 5 times more neutrons with an 
energy 7 times higher
3
. This gives only an idea of the 
issue at stake.  
Finally, we should not forget the transport of 
activated materials through the cooling fluid and even by 
the atmosphere during maintenance and opening of the 
vacuum vessel. This transport, which is common and 
rather well known in fission reactors, depends  a lot on the 
fluid physico-chemical conditions (temperature, pressure, 
purity, pH, oxygen content etc…) and is probably the 
main cause of activity dispersion in the plant. Moreover 
the transport and deposition of radioactive species induces 
exposition of workers to radiations, and is thus an 
important factor to consider. This topic will be analysed 
in chapter IV below. 
 
 
III. THE NUCLEAR SAFETY AND CONFINEMENT, 
THE SECURITY AND THE RADIOPROTECTION 
 
One of the first impacts of the presence of 
radioactive materials and species in a fusion power plant 
is surely the safety aspect and the radioprotection. Nuclear 
safety is of prime importance in a fusion power plant 
                                                          
3
 To be more scientifically correct, we should speak about 
the neutron flux, for which the ratio is more complicated. 
This comparison is only given here to have some taste of 
the difference. 
although the absence of fission fuel and its radioactive 
content reduces strongly the risks and source term in case 
of an accident compared to fission plant.  
Nevertheless, the confinement of the radioactive 
species, present in a fusion reactor, in all cases of 
operation (up to the less credible accident) has to be 
assured in order to avoid any spread of radioactive 
contamination in the environment and to avoid absolutely 
any need of evacuation of the population in the 
surrounding of the plant in any case. This is probably one 
of the main objectives of the safety approach of a fusion 
power plant design. The aspects of radioprotection of the 
workers and operators will be analysed further. 
The basis of the safety approach for a fusion power 
plant can be taken from the ITER Generic Site Safety 
Report [3]. Let us thus first define the safety objectives: 
“ITER's safety objectives address the potential 
hazards in ITER from normal operation, accidents and 
waste: 
(1) ensure in normal operation that exposure to 
hazards within the premises is controlled, kept 
below prescribed limits, and minimised;  
(2) ensure in normal operation that exposure to 
hazards due to any discharge of hazardous material 
from the premises is controlled, kept below 
prescribed limits, and minimised;  
(3) prevent accidents with high confidence;  
(4) ensure that the consequences, if any, of more 
frequent events are minor and that the likelihood of 
accidents with higher consequences is low;  
(5) demonstrate that the consequences from internal 
accidents are bounded as a result of the favourable 
safety characteristics of fusion together with 
appropriate safety approaches so that there may be, 
according to IAEA guidelines [IAEA96], technical 
justification for not needing evacuation of the 
public (external hazards are site dependent, but are 
considered for a generic site);  
(6) reduce radioactive waste hazards and volumes.” 
 
One can also consider the safety principles used for 
the ITER GSSR [3], as basic principles for a fusion power 
plant (although the experimental character of ITER has 
also some specific aspects, which are not taken into 
account here): 
 
Defence-in-Depth 
All activities are subject to overlapping levels of 
safety provisions so that a failure at one level would 
be compensated by other provisions. Priority shall be 
given to preventing accidents. Protection measures 
shall be implemented in sub-systems as needed to 
prevent damage to confinement barriers. In addition, 
measures to mitigate the consequences of postulated 
accidents shall be provided, including successive or 
nested barriers for confinement of hazardous 
materials. 
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Passive Safety 
Passive safety shall be given special attention. It is 
based on natural laws, properties of materials, and 
internally stored energy. Passive features, in 
particular minimisation of hazardous inventories, 
help assure ultimate safety margins. (…)” 
 
Potential safety concerns that must be considered 
during the design process to minimize challenges to the 
public safety function of confinement of radioactive 
and/or hazardous materials include, but should not be 
limited to the following [4]: 
a. ensuring afterheat removal when required; 
b. providing rapid controlled reduction in plasma 
energy when required; 
c. controlling coolant energy (e.g., pressurized water, 
cryogens); 
d. controlling chemical energy sources; 
e. controlling magnetic energy (e.g., toroidal and 
poloidal field stored energy); 
f. limiting airborne and liquid releases to the 
environment. 
 
Tritium 
From the DOE Guidance [5], Tritium system design 
should include features which minimize the 
environmental release of tritium and exposure of 
personnel, minimize quantities of tritium available 
for release during accidents or off-normal events, 
and minimize the unintended conversion of 
elemental tritium to an oxide form. Consistent with 
facility safety analysis, design features should 
include: 
1. Segmentation of the tritium inventory such that 
release of all tritium from the single largest 
segmented volume has acceptable 
consequences; 
2. Confinement barriers to reduce tritium 
environmental release to an acceptable level; 
3. Materials and equipment which are tritium 
compatible and minimize exposure of tritium to 
oxygen; and 
4. Cleanup systems to recover gaseous tritium 
released within any confinement barrier or to 
process streams exhausting to atmosphere. 
 
Aspects of Security 
Beyond the safety aspects of a fusion plant, the 
security (i.e. the physical protection against 
unfriendly acts or terrorism) of the installation is 
also an aspect to be developed. The main item to 
defend is probably the tritium inventory (see below), 
but the diversion of activated or contaminated 
materials should also be taken into account as well 
as sabotage actions or even external attacks. 
Fortunately, the “source term” in a fusion plant is 
limited to its activated (and contaminated) 
components and to the tritium inventory. As the 
activated species are mostly bound within solid 
components (first wall and blanket module; divertor, 
etc), except for the produced dust and for the 
components coolant, the main source of easily 
escaping radio-nuclide is the tritium inventory. That 
is why a particular attention is placed towards the 
monitoring and control of the tritium inventory, and 
to the separation of this inventory in small parts not 
possible to mobilize together. 
 
The purposes of requirements placed on tritium 
control, accountability, and physical protection at fusion 
facilities are to [4]: 
a. meet legal requirements for environmental 
releases, waste disposal, and transportation of 
tritium; 
b. prevent the diversion of the material for 
unauthorized use; 
c. gain knowledge of the process efficiency, that is, 
how much tritium is produced and used in 
processes under investigation; 
d. meet the requirements of the safety authorities; 
e. assure operational safety of the facilities by 
providing knowledge of the location and form of 
tritium; 
f. prevent unwanted buildup of tritium within a 
facility; and 
g. protect and control tritium commensurate with its 
monetary value. 
 
Tritium is the predominant nuclear material used at 
fusion facilities. It is of interest because of safety 
concerns, its monetary value, and possible unauthorized 
diversion for other applications. 
Other nuclear material that must be controlled and 
accounted for at fusion facilities includes depleted 
uranium (U-238) and deuterium. Depleted uranium is 
used for storage of tritium, fission chambers, and various 
radioactive check- and calibration-sources. The control 
and accountability of these materials is relatively 
straightforward and does not present significant problems 
for operating facilities. The scope and extent of the 
accountability program for these materials should be 
based on the monetary value of the material and should 
include inventories and some measurements. 
 
ALARA and radioprotection optimization 
The ALARA approach (“As Low As Reasonably 
Achievable”) is not only an acronym but has led to a 
complete approach of the radioprotection optimization. 
Indeed the principle which is behind this acronym implies 
several aspects which should be taken into account. The 
term “Reasonably” for instance is probably one of the 
most important; it translates into ‘reasonably’ regarding 
the economic and social impact and constraints. Therefore 
this principle can almost be opposed to the “As Low As 
Technically Possible”, which should also mean ‘at every 
cost’! And this can have ethical implications. Indeed, one 
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can protect anybody from even not harmful risks with 
high economic impact. But as the overall available money 
is always limited, for any type of project or practice, this 
means that this money (used for nothing) is no more 
available for other means (like e.g. modernizing a hospital 
or promoting R&D against cancer etc…).  
 
On the other hand the radioprotection optimization 
approach under the ALARA principle should also take 
into account the whole lifecycle of the involved 
component or activity. As example, let us take the 
development of low activation materials (for facilitating 
the remote handling of the maintenance); this is good for 
the maintenance activity, but in the overall study one 
should also take into account the effects on the waste 
management and even the final effect after disposal… 
Moreover the ALARA approach can be done at the design 
phase of a facility as it allows to make large gains with 
limited (but smart) investments.  
 
 
IV. THE NUCLEAR “CLEANLINESS” AND 
TRANSPORT OF RADIOACTIVITY 
 
Materials exposed to neutron flux have to present a 
cleanliness above normal industrial standard, as the 
production of activated products often depends on trace 
impurities (in materials) or on traces of impurities on 
materials. In the case of fusion reactors, the components 
and materials situated inside the vacuum vessel and 
exposed to the plasma and to the low vacuum needed for 
operating the system, already imply a sufficient 
cleanliness of the exposed materials. Nevertheless, these 
components are not the only ones exposed to the neutron 
flux, and probably most of the difficulties will happen in 
the cooling circuits and any other loops allowing some 
fluid to circulate for a while in front of the neutron source. 
For instance, in fission power plant, most of the 
occupational dose is due to the contamination of the 
primary loop and the transport of radioactive species from 
the core of the reactor to the surface of the whole cooling 
loops. This will surely also happen in fusion power plant, 
where the exposed surface of the cooling fluid is rather 
important (although the mass of the cooling fluid is 
probably lower than in an LWR where the complete core 
and auxiliary are immersed in the primary water). 
 
A. Contamination and Activated Corrosion Products 
(ACP) 
 
One nuclear aspect, which forms an important factor 
for the exposure of workers and operators, is the 
radioactive contamination of cooling circuits. Moreover it 
can have also an impact on the waste management from 
fusion reactor decommissioning and large maintenance 
works. Therefore, it appears to be important to study this 
topic and take profit of the return of experience from 
fission. 
Areas with large deposition surfaces and strong 
temperature gradients, like the heat exchangers and steam 
generators, constitute often large sources of radiations 
influencing the maintenance of the facilities. The main 
radio-isotope playing a role in fission plants in this 
domain is the Cobalt-60. With a half-life of 5.24 years 
and a double gamma-rays above 1 MeV, this radio-
isotope represents, in fission reactors, one of the most 
important source of radiations originating from activation. 
In fusion reactors, where most of the water cooling loops 
are mostly foreseen in stainless steel, the presence of 
Cobalt in the water chemistry is quasi unavoidable. But 
one big difference is the neutron energy, as the production 
of Co-60 from the stable Co-59 has its largest cross-
section for thermal neutrons. But other threshold reactions 
can happen at high neutron energy (above 1 MeV) and the 
neutron energy spectrum can be degraded when reaching 
the cooling fluids, which can even further slowdown the 
neutron flux. 
Some of the potential radio-isotopes, presenting a 
role in radioactive contamination of the cooling circuits 
are given below. 
 
 
 
Table 2: some of the important radionuclides for 
radioprotection (ORE) and waste management aspects. 
 
The actual rate of erosion/dissolution/deposition 
depends on a lot of other parameters, like the water 
chemistry, the local water velocity, the temperature 
differences, the solubility of various elements etc… which 
makes the modeling of this phenomenon rather complex. 
(see fig.2)  
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Figure 2: the various interactions and transport routes of 
radionuclides in cooling medias [6] 
 
Nevertheless, based on fission experience, several 
aspects should be taken into account: 
- envisage the possibility of decontaminating the 
loop during shutdown and maintenance periods; 
- foresee sufficient shielding (or potential shielding 
space) around large exposed surface components 
(like heat exchangers); 
- avoid spaces with stagnant fluid of with abrupt 
flow changes; 
- keep the water chemistry under good control, and 
filter + purify water sufficiently (often, the 
filtration/purification loop is made on a by-pass of 
the main flow. Consider sufficient by-pass flow 
rate to avoid accumulation of ACP). 
 
B. Airborne contamination and radioactive species 
transport during maintenance. 
 
During shut down and maintenance outages of 
fusion plants, the vacuum vessel will be put at 
atmospheric pressure and can even be opened towards the 
external world for introducing remote handling inspection 
and repair machines. This opening brings the possibility 
of dispersing the existing contamination from the vessel 
internals towards the outside world. The main 
contamination sources being the tritium trapped in the 
metal structures and the dust deposited everywhere in the 
vacuum vessel. This dust is activated and can also contain 
some trapped tritium.  
To mitigate as much as possible this source of 
contamination several processes can be put in place. The 
first one is indeed to collect the contaminants at the 
source; i.e. detriatiating as much as possible the vacuum 
vessel and its internals, and collecting or removing the 
dust as soon as the vessel is open. Nevertheless, none of 
these actions can insure 100% of removal. Therefore, 
when opening the vacuum vessel (including ports and 
neutral beam injectors) one should insure a pressure 
cascade between the outside atmospheric pressure and the 
inside pressure of the vessel, using adapted ventilation 
system. Several levels of the cascade should avoid or 
reduce the risk of contamination spread. 
These effects have an impact on the occupational 
radiation exposure of the operators, but also on the 
consequences of an accident, on the waste management 
and on the needed handling systems for components 
replacement and repairs. 
 
 
V. FUNDAMENTALS OF THE NEUTRONS 
INTERACTION WITH MATTER 
 
Neutrons are, as indicated by their names, neutral 
particles, constitutive of the atom nucleus. Neutrons are 
ejected with high energy from the plasma (about 14 MeV 
or 1.93 10
8
 m/s). But neutrons have various interactions 
with matter. Let us summarize the most important ones 
(see also fig. 3 below): 
- it goes through the material without interactions; 
this can mostly happen as the neutrons are not 
charged, and if they have a high energy (or speed) 
most of them would not “see” the atoms of the 
matter; 
- it can undergo elastic scattering against (mostly) 
light atoms, i.e. like bouncing of billiard balls, and 
sharing its energy between the neutron and the 
knocked atoms. This is for instance what is used 
for the slowing down of neutrons in thermal fission 
reactors; 
- it can undergo what is called inelastic scattering, 
where the neutron is absorbed by the target atom, 
which re-emits another neutron with another 
energy; 
- it can be absorbed by an atomic nucleus, leading to 
excitation and transmutation of the atom, and/or to 
several types of reactions implying the emission of 
other particles (n,p; n,; n,γ; etc…); the n, 
reaction is also called "radiative capture"; 
- or it can induce fission of heavy nuclei (mostly of 
the actinides of the periodic table). 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Various categories of neutron interactions. The 
letters separated by commas in the parentheses show the 
incoming and outgoing particles. [7] 
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The type of interaction strongly depends on the 
energy of the neutrons. Some reactions (mostly of 
absorption and re-emission of particles) have threshold 
energy under which the reaction does not appear; but a lot 
of them have a reaction rate (given in so-called "cross 
section") decreasing as 1/v, thus with much more 
probability at low (and very low) energy. At low energies, 
below 1 MeV, the elastic cross section is nearly constant, 
whereas the inelastic scattering cross section and 
absorption cross sections are proportional to the reciprocal 
of the neutron’s speed  (that is, 1/v).[7] 
 
 
 
Figure 4: ex. of cross sections for Carbon, with elastic 
scattering in 1/v and threshold reactions (Univ. Rochester) 
Moreover, due to the scattering of neutrons, their 
interactions can be spread to rather large volumes, away 
from the first knocked atom (see fig. 5 below). 
 
 
 
Figure 5: example of Monte-Carlo simulation of 
neutrons scattering in various materials [7]  
 
 
These various interactions can lead to different 
macroscopic effects on the materials which are 
bombarded: 
- Changes in mechanical properties by the formation 
of vacancies/interstitial atoms and the 
disorganization of the crystal structure; 
- Activation of the elements and thus induced 
radioactivity (effects on the occupational exposure 
and on the waste management); 
- Generated heat inside the material, often 
proportional to the material density (implying the 
need for cooling); 
- Changes in electronic bonds and thus changes in 
the electric/thermal properties of the materials; 
- Etc. 
 
These effects and their implications for the design 
and operation of future fusion facilities and power plants 
will be shortly described in the following chapters. 
 
 
VI. EFFECTS ON THE MECHANICAL PROPERTIES 
OF STRUCTURAL MATERIALS 
 
The effects of neutrons on the mechanical properties 
of materials are very various and depend on the type of 
materials, on the present nuclei and isotopes, on the 
energy of the neutrons etc. In this chapter we will focus 
on the effects on structural materials, mainly concentrated 
on metallic materials. The effects on other materials, like 
beryllium or tungsten e.g. will also be tackled, mostly for 
the surface properties, as plasma facing components.  
 
Neutrons can displace the atoms from their lattice 
position by elastic or inelastic scattering. This will indeed 
imply direct effects on the mechanical properties as it 
induce local defects that will be analyzed further. On the 
other hand, the n,p and n, reactions involve the 
production of gas (H2 and He) which can then diffuse 
through the material, aggregate and form gas bubbles 
which subsequently induce swelling.  
 
As a general rule of thumb, for most of the metallic 
materials studied till now, the neutron irradiation induces 
an increase in the Yield Strength and the Ultimate Tensile 
Strength of the material with a parallel embrittlement 
(loss of ductility at high stress). At the same time, the 
fracture toughness is reduced and, due to the production 
of gas inside the material, swelling appears (at 
macroscopic level) and some effects on the creep 
resistance are often measured. However, these are only 
general trends, and each material shows specific influence 
depending also on the thermal treatments applied and on 
its crystal structure. These effects depend also strongly on 
the temperature range at which the material will be used 
(e.g. possibility of relaxation of some effects at high 
temperatures), on the physicochemical environment and 
sometimes on the stress or strain rate at which the 
material is submitted.  
 
The in-depth study of the mechanical effects of 
neutrons on metallic materials is a domain of scientific 
knowledge in itself, and is rather complex to understand 
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and model. Most effects models are currently based on 
empirical equations tuned to fit the experimental results 
obtained in various types of irradiations conditions. The 
most known materials for high energy (> 1 MeV) 
neutrons effects, are austenitic stainless steels (type AISI 
304, 316 and specific grades) which were developed for 
the fast breeder reactors and are also used as internals in 
the Light Water Reactors operated today. 
 
Moreover, the effects of neutron irradiation are 
inherently multiscale, in space, time and number of atoms 
concerned. It varies indeed from instantaneous effects (ps) 
to long terms effects (Gs), from submicroscopic effects 
(Å, nm) to large macroscopic effects (m) and concerns 
small clusters from 10
2
 to 10
31
 atoms
 … [8] 
 
In the figure below are summarized some typical 
effects of irradiation on stainless steels. 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Typical effects of neutrons on austenitic 
stainless steels (example of effects on tensile properties, 
creep resistance, fracture toughness and swelling) [8] 
 
The effects of the microstructure of the metals are 
also important factors to take into account. Metallic 
materials are often constituted of "grains" which consist 
of single crystals (bcc, fcc, hcp, …). The grains present 
different orientations and are separated by grain 
boundaries. Most of the metals used in structural materials 
(and in steels) are alloys which are composed of several 
alloying elements, and some impurities. For the neutron 
effects, even the impurities can have an important impact 
on the microstructure.  Finally, for modeling and 
understanding of the phenomena happening in the 
microstructure of the materials, one has to take into 
accounts the defect structures: dislocations, gas bubbles, 
cavities (voids), vacant lattice sites (vacancies), 
interstitials. 
 
Point defects (vacancies and interstitials) are created 
by the radiations. They undergo reactions and 
aggregations (clustering), as they can move and diffuse in 
materials. The modeling of these effects and of their 
diffusion and effects on the macroscopic properties of the 
materials is currently a subject of a lot of research (see 
e.g. [9]). 
 
 
 
Figure 7: view of the effects of "damages"(dpa)  and gas 
formation in metallic materials (A. Möslang, 2009) 
 
 
Finally, the choice of the alloying elements (and of 
the following impurities) is very important also for the 
activation of the components, with implications on remote 
handling constraints and waste management. Fusion 
reactors being often much larger (in volume) than fission 
reactors, and the replacement of the Plasma Facing 
Components (PFC) being foreseen at rather high 
frequency (e.g. replacement every 3 or 5 years of the 
divertors) this aspect of low activation or reduced 
activation material is very important for the overall 
environmental impact of fusion. Therefore the selection of 
the alloys and alloying elements is also constraint by this 
aspect [10] (e.g. one should avoid Re as alloying element 
as it gives rise to long lived radionuclides). See also the 
chapter IX below. 
The current R&D on structural material in magnetic 
fusion mostly focuses on the ferritic/martensitic steel, 
more particularly to the reduced activation alloy called 
"Eurofer". 
 
A second aspect, which should also be looked at, is 
the effect of neutron irradiation on plasma facing 
components. Here the material challenge is still more 
severe: the material must be compatible with the high 
thermal heat flux (up to 10 MW/m² on the divertor), the 
sputtering and blistering due to particles impacts, the 
compatibility with the plasma (low Z material), together 
with the radiation damages and transformations. 
Moreover, the PFC must present a low tritium trapping 
behavior to avoid tritium inventory buildup in the plasma 
facing materials and in flakes and dust.  
All these qualities together do not lead to a lot of 
remaining materials. For plasma compatibility (low Z) 
and high heat flux (and high temperature) resistance, the 
Carbon composites seems to give the most interesting 
answers, but they show a tendency to have a high tritium 
retention. For plasma compatibility and sputtering, this is 
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the case for Beryllium; but this element has bad sputtering 
resistance qualities and is not very well fitted for high 
heat flux; it is moreover toxic and thus difficult to handle. 
Vanadium and Vanadium alloys seems to present some 
potentiality but their radiation induced damages are 
precluding their use. Finally, today the R&D focuses 
mostly on Tungsten and Tungsten alloys for its high heat 
flux resistance, low sputtering behavior and relatively 
good behavior towards the neutron irradiation which 
compensates for its high Z property. Silicium Carbide 
fibers in Silicium Carbide matrix (SiC/SiCf) seems also 
promising but is far to be developed sufficiently.  
An example is the sputtering rate: for low Z material 
like Carbon, the erosion is of the order of 3mm/burn-year 
while for Tungsten it is around 0.1 mm/burn-year [Wirth]. 
 
 
VII. THE RADIATION RESISTANCE OF 
DIAGNOSTICS AND FUNCTIONAL COMPONENTS 
 
The effects of neutrons on organic or amorphous 
materials is also important for diagnostics, 
instrumentation and remote handling components. 
Changes in the insulation resistance of insulators, 
darkening of glass and optical components, changes in the 
lubricating properties of oils or embritlement of the 
components can play an important role in the design and 
selection of materials for the measuring instruments or 
functional materials of fusion facilities.  
 
Functional components are concerned by the neutron 
irradiation and the impact on their operation and 
"function". We will focus here mostly on diagnostics and 
instrumentation components and equipment. Up to now 
this equipment, to measure the various plasma parameters, 
was designed to resist to the high vacuum and sometimes 
high temperature environment, plus the presence of strong 
electro-magnetic fields.  
 
The nuclear environment adds another difficulty to 
these components. First of all, the presence of neutrons 
and of strong gamma field (due to the radioactive decay 
of neutron activated metallic component in the vacuum 
vessel) precludes the use of most organic materials as 
insulator. In high radiation environment, only mineral 
insulation (like MgO or Al2O3) ceramic insulation 
materials can be used.  
The use of semi-conductors must also be done with 
care, and high electronic circuit integration in high level 
radiation field is not advisable.  
The use of optical components (windows, fiber 
optics, even mirrors) can also be influenced by the 
presence of radiations and the selection of the specific 
materials and assembly process must be done with great 
care and after intensive testing in similar conditions. 
 
Several studies have been carried out during the last 
10 to 20 years to develop and test radiation hardened 
components and systems. Nevertheless, sophisticated 
systems and highly integrated circuits tends to show 
strong sensitivity to radiations. 
 
One can give here some generic and simplified 
trends shown by various components under radiation (but 
for more details, please refer to the literature): 
- In high radiation fields, use mostly mineral; 
insulators instead of organic ones; 
- Semi-conductors can be sensitive to radiations and 
circuits have to be designed fault-tolerant if used in 
semi-hard radiation fields (never directly in the 
strong neutronic field); 
- Optical instruments (and their bonding system) 
tends to be radiation sensitive if not selected 
carefully; the presence of impurities in the glass 
can have dramatic impact on the properties; 
- Fiber optics show in general the same trend as 
optical glasses, but some typical fiber types can 
resist to some radiation levels allowing to use them 
in specific locations. 
 
There is a range of effects on insulating and 
functional materials that one can summarize in the 
following list : 
- Radiation-induced conductivity (RIC); 
- Radiation induced electrical degradation (RIED); 
- Radiation-induced electromotive force (RIEMF); 
- Radiation-induced thermo-electric sensitivity 
(RITES); 
- Radiation induced absorption (RIA) for optical 
components; 
- Radioluminescence (RL or RIE) e.g. in fiber optics 
- Nuclear heating; 
- Change in other properties such as activation, 
transmutation and swelling. 
 
For further details on the impact on diagnostics and 
remote handling, see also the lecture of A. Donné. 
 
 
VIII. THE ACTIVATION OF MATERIALS AND THE 
REMOTE HANDLING 
 
The activation of materials has been described 
above. The very high activation level (giving up to tens of 
kGy/h radiation field) of the plasma facing components 
induces the impossibility to have human intervention in 
the plasma chamber after the D-T reactions. Moreover, 
the rather long distance of actions of neutrons and the 
transport of activated product also preclude human 
intervention in the vicinity of the vacuum vessel and of 
the neutral beam lines. 
The principal elements that are leading to activation 
in the metallic parts (first wall, shielding, divertor, 
blanket,…) surrounding the plasma are the nickel, 
chromium, iron, cobalt and copper leading to the 
production of Co-60, Mn-54, Cr-51, Cu-64…  Other 
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isotopes are also produced, depending on the alloying 
elements used and the impurities present in the metals. 
The activation data is a rather complex topic as it depends 
on the local neutron flux, the operation and exposure data, 
the presence of impurities in the metals etc. The activation 
leads e.g. to high requirements in the purity of the metals 
(removal of several important impurities [10]) but also on 
the potential alloying elements. As example, there is 
currently an optimization study for the tungsten alloy to 
be used for power plant divertors. Beyond the mechanical 
and thermal behavior in irradiated situation, the used 
alloying elements should not lead to high activation for 
handling purposes, but also for waste management and 
environmental impact aspects (see chapter IX below). 
 
Therefore, remote handling has to be used for all 
inspection, maintenance and repair works to be carried out 
in these areas, as well as for decommissioning. Remote 
handling is thus a real challenge for these activities, as it 
has to work in a rather harsh environment (high 
radiations, temperature, vacuum for some case). 
Moreover, the geometry and the available space for 
maintenance and repair are also rather complex and 
limited leading to challenging operations and complicated 
movements. 
 
 
 
Figure 8: remote handling of ITER shielding block  
(ITER.org) 
 
Several R&D works are currently on going for 
developing the needed equipment and testing the 
components in the foreseen environment. A first trial was 
already made at JET, for replacing remotely the complete 
first wall. 
Several aspects need to be taken into account for the 
design of remote handling systems: 
- the accessibility of the component to replace (some 
"tiles" or first wall components in the torus are not 
easily accessible); 
- the weight of the heaviest component or tool to be 
handled by the RH system (some pieces can be 
very heavy: the divertor cassettes in ITER for 
instance are already weighing more than 10 tons); 
- the limited access through narrow ports;  
- the potential contamination by dust (from 
beryllium, tungsten or carbon, with tritium content 
and activated products); 
- the high to very high gamma radiation field (more 
than 30 kGy/h); 
- the unavailability of direct viewing conditions 
(only televisual connection); 
- the ultra-high vacuum and nuclear cleanliness 
requirements. 
 
The main impacts of the nuclear aspects of a fusion 
plant concerns the resistance to radiations of all 
components (actuators, motors, sensors, …) and the 
necessary cleanliness and easiness to wash the potential 
contamination of the manipulators and vehicles. 
The resistance to radiations can lead to special 
developments of the whole systems (like e.g.  the use of 
water instead of oil for hydraulic high payload 
manipulators) [11] , to the use of radiation resistant 
sensors and vision systems (this implying the same 
approach as for the diagnostics systems - see chapter VII 
above) and the development of actuators and motors with 
limited (or even no) organic content and specific 
insulation and lubricant materials.  
The development of such remote handling system, 
with strong request and resistance to severe and harsh 
environment is also a technical challenge for today's 
technology. 
 
 
IX. THE RADIOACTIVE WASTE AND RECYCLING 
 
Even if fusion would not produce long lived 
radioactive waste, regarding the high volume and mass 
surrounding the plasma chamber, fusion will probably 
produce, by far, much more quantity of short lived waste 
than any other facilities. But the quantity and mostly the 
“quality” of the generated radioactive waste (i.e. its 
radioactive lifetime and its possibility to be recycled) 
depends strongly on the individual constituents of the 
materials facing the plasma (incl. impurities).  
 
Therefore, it is of very high importance for the 
design and selection of the materials facing the plasma but 
also likely to be bombarded by neutrons, to take these 
aspects of waste management and recycling into 
consideration.  
 
Several studies have already been carried out in this 
domain (see e.g. [12, 13, 14]) but a lot remains to be done 
to develop  the necessary process and infrastructure 
allowing to dismantle, condition and recycle the materials 
generated by the regular maintenance and replacement of 
a fusion plant. 
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To give some idea of the magnitude of the problem, 
the structural and functional metallic material situated 
around the plasma in one of the European fusion power 
plant conceptual design (PPCS-AB) had a mass of about 
97,000 tons! This represents 13 times the mass of the 
Eiffel tower… And the mass of the replaceable 
components in ITER (divertors and first wall) represents a 
(potentially activated) mass of about 800 tons (above 
2000 with the shielding). 
  
Once again the first mitigation technique of this 
issue is to treat the problem at the source; i.e. developing 
materials without isotopes leading to long-lived 
radionuclides [waste1] and developing materials with a 
strong control on the impurities level (often the 
impurities, even at trace levels, can have an impact on the 
long lived waste stream). Moreover, the design of the 
components has to be such that their dismantling and the 
separation of the different constituents (made of different 
materials) must be easy to carry out remotely.  
 
On the other side, methods and process for 
recycling/reuse of material have to be developed, to avoid 
generating too much waste for disposal. Recycling and 
reuse means to handle, work on and refabricate (slightly) 
radioactive materials into new elements for re-use in 
fusion reactors or recycle within the nuclear industry. 
Clearance and free release is another way of disposing 
materials, if the remaining radioactivity (after decay 
storage) is low enough to have negligible effects on the 
populations and environment.  
 
 The question is whether it is feasible to fabricate the 
complex units of a fusion plant under remote control 
conditions. Indeed, for the higher activity pieces it will 
not be possible to reuse highly activated materials for 
shielding or other “simple” purposes, unless radioisotopes 
are removed during reprocessing. Reuse of these materials 
in a fusion power plant or an advanced fission next-
generation reactor seems the only option. Therefore, 
sophisticated fabrication and testing processes have to be 
looked at in detail and limits must be defined if 
applicable. The use of refractory materials (such as Nb, 
Mo,Ta, W, Re) may need innovative approach. 
This would lead to a material cycle approach, as 
follows, if all the steps can be developed on time and with 
the available technology: 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Fusion power potential material cycle [11] 
 
To summarize this topic, there are still some open 
questions, which have to be solved or answered in order 
to reduce the generated waste amount and tend towards a 
low radioactive waste production (and thus low 
environmental impact) from fusion energy production: 
- Definition of undesirable alloying elements;  
- Assessment of radioactivity build-up by repeated 
reuse of structural materials;  
- Dismantling and separation of different materials 
from complex components: different steps to 
follow and impact on design requirements;  
- Developing processes for the production of 
material suitable for recycling;  
- Fabrication of complex components using recycled 
materials by remote handling and related design 
approach; 
- Acceptable limits for processing of radioactive 
materials in foundries; 
- Study of (Li-Pb) breeder refurbishment by 
chemical process for reuse. 
 
The back end of material re-use is thus an important 
factor in preparing the future of fusion power. 
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X. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The nuclear aspects of a fusion power plant are 
rather new to tackle. Up to now, only very few machines 
(JET, TFTR) in the world have worked in D-T plasmas, 
with very limited amount of tritium (the total amount in 
JET was 20 g, to be compared with the 3 kg foreseen in 
ITER) and a very low neutron flux on the walls and in-
vessel components compared to the ones expected in 
ITER and future fusion power plants.  
The nuclear aspects of a plant are various and must 
be taken into account in parallel with other issues; 
moreover, the experience gained in fission power plant 
can be very valuable for drawing lessons and taking the 
best solutions for different aspects.  
Beside the safety aspects (including the 
radioprotection of the workers and population), one can 
understand that the aspects of materials properties and the 
impact of neutrons and the nuclear environment on these 
materials are of prime importance. 
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